The case of Stephen Lawrence raised two issues: racism and competence. By far the greatest amount of attention has been given to the race issue, understandably as this was the mainspring of the enquiry. It does not follow, however, that racism was the key issue in what was clearly not a successful investigation. With little, if any, substantive evidence, but powerful intuition and supposition, the police were convicted of racism in a courtroom observing quite different rules than those seen to be essential to fairness in other cases. None of this diminishes the concern about racism. The police must be seen not merely to be no worse than any other institution, but overtly and actively against racism. Thus, the Service has embraced the Home Secretary's approach rather, I suspect, than because of the detailed findings of Lord McPherson's enquiry.
The real issue, however, concerns competence. The Deputy Chief Constable of Kent County Constabulary conducted the enquiry into the Lawrence case and his report, which was followed almost to the letter by the Lawrence enquiry, although given scant recognition, revealed a number of serious flaws touching upon the conduct of the investigation. Whilst not wishing to trumpet the failings of another force on one occasion (there have been over 700 murders in the Metropolitan District since the murder of Stephen Lawrence), nonetheless, from a professional point of view it is almost a shame that emphasis on the race dimension obscured the more critical issue of professional competence in general.
From the first shudders following the appeal of Judith Ward, through increasing tremors in other much publicized disclosure cases, until the effect was positively seismic, a sea change in the conduct of cases was evident. Whatever the law used to be concerning the prosecution's obligation to disclose, it had certainly never been understood or practised if that meant there was an obligation to assist the defence with every item ofinformation that might possibly help their cause. This is now accepted by all parties, although it remains a police view that there should be some equivalent responsibility of disclosure on the side of the defence. It is the disclosure argument which has placed an entirely new emphasis on criminal cases. Its unintended and perhaps inevitable consequence, at least in the English adversarial system, is a decisive shift towards 'due process'justice. The essence of a successful defence now often lies in attacking the provenance of the evidence. Disclosure provides the ammunition for that assault.
Traditionally forensic evidence has always relied upon proving continuity to rebut any possible argument of contamination or interference. In a very real way this regime is now an imperative for all evidence. The Criminal Prosecutions and Investigations Act 1996, in formulating the present position, recognizes the logical consequences of a disclosure regime and in effect makes the conduct of the investigation accountable to the trial. If you are obliged to capture all possible evidence of value to prosecution or defence, and preserve it for possible disclosure, and if you can be tested upon your observance of this rule, then effectively the policy decisions of the investigation and the methods of evidence procurement themselves become an issue.
The signal lesson for policing, and indeed for prosecutors, is that we must take the forensic model as a paradigm for investigation in gen-eral. Given the sheer complexity and confusion of many enquiries at their outset, if we are not to reduce the investigator to a neurotic state fearing some minor fragment might not have been captured, we have to bring order to the febrile and confused circumstances which often occur in the early stages of an investigation. This means formulating the investigative method and buttressing it with an accountable regime. To this end, as a first step, the Crime Committee of ACPO has produced a comprehensive manual on homicide investigation. It provides investigators with a logical system and teaches them to move away from a craft model, hopefully in a more scientific direction. The word 'scientific' implies, to my mind at least, the use of mathematics which is probably too tight a description. However, we can adopt many of the principles of the scientific method. We can calculate probabilities; we can create hypotheses; we can test them; we can render the data to analysis; we can search for incongruities; ultimately we can locate fragments of evidence within a logical scheme. To be 'scientific' all must be recorded and accountable.
In some degree the European Convention of Human Rights provides a similar stimulus. Wherever we employ methods against suspects which intrude upon their privacy, which logically is the very nature of investigation and patently so if the investigation is covert, we have to prove that what we have done was justifiable, proportionate and lawful. Once again therefore we are in the business of maintaining records and following procedures. The Convention was designed to protect citizens from oppressive governments, following World War II. Today, in the west, they are palpably more threatened by oppressive criminals and it is vital privacy principles do not succour organized crime. Finding the right balance to keep law enforcement in the game will be a function of our ability to follow the rules of the game. Under the Convention this will be about valid reasoning processes to demonstrate proper cause and proportionality, also the use of properly qualified and suitably knowledgeable staff.
At the outset I used the term 'sea change'. As I see it there is only one way for law enforce-ment to proceed if it is to be effective against cleverly defended criminals. The old model of craft is doomed. Investigations have now to be managed, pursued and engaged rather in the fashion of a laboratory researcher. All must be recorded and procedures must be validated. This requires a far better trained and intellectually sharper investigator than we knew two decades ago. The pressure will increase and the Service must make rapid progress unless we, like the Red Queen, find the scenery moving as rapidly as we ourselves.
There is a sense in which these proposals affect the courts as much as the police. Ifwe are to regard the investigation and the collection of evidence by the police as an activity akin to the forensic search of a crime scene, then the courts must be prepared to deal with the product. I suspect there is still considerable reluctance in this direction. Counsel are acknowledged for their skill in the courtroom by their ability to examine and cross-examine witnesses in the witness box. What I suggest may considerably restrict these opportunities as far as 'police evidence' is concerned. Instead of questioning the Inspector about an identification parade, we should see a carefully prepared audio/visual record of the event. Instead of counsel for the prosecution reading the questions and the officer laboriously reading the answers given by the defendant in the traditional courtroom scenario, we will see an audio/video ofthe interview. Instead of subjecting victims to memory tests in the witness box, we will see an audio/video of their original complaints to the police and the cognitive interview which followed. Instead of officers' descriptions of events in fracas and affrays, we might see film of what transpired. Whilst more and more video material is leeching into the courts, there is still a reluctance to regard 'police evidence' obtained in this fashion as standing on its own merit.
I have argued in the past that if we are interested in the truth the jury should see the best evidence, not the secondary evidence which is either most convenient to court business or to the tactical opportunities of counsel. Indeed if, as is usually not the case, pre-trial procedures such as were envisaged in the Criminal and Prosecutions Investigations Act were organized with any vigour to establish exactly what was in issue, any extra time in examining contentious evidence might easily be compensated for. The real problem is the culture parading itself under the so-called 'principle of orality', (whereby all evidence is spake from the witness box), which is actively hostile to a technology threatening old skills.
If we move more and more towards a collection of audio/visual evidence products, undoubtedly a technical debate will emerge concerning the extent to which such evidence could be manipulated. This will ofitselfnecessitate appropriate technology and accountable auditable regimes. I foresee a considerable ex-Phillips: Editorial: The Forensic Detective 187 pansion of forensic activity both here and indeed in relation to crimes facilitated by modern information technology.
It is conceivable that we will witness a reversal of fortunes. Whilst the assault upon police and forensic evidence pursuant of cause celebre cases seemed to place the prosecution at a considerable disadvantage, the longerterm result might be such an improvement in method that the investigative effort becomes formidable. I believe the pressure for change in the courts will be irresistible. The real test for policing will be of our ability to provide investigators of such credibility that they resemble in every respect the best forensic scientists.
